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The rise and fall of Turkey’s soft
power discourse
Discourse in foreign policy under Davutoğlu and Erdoğan
Yohanan Benhaïm and Kerem Öktem
 
Introduction
1 Since  the  early  2000s,  Turkey’s  profile  on  the  world  stage  has  been  significantly
transformed.  From a  doctrine  of  realism and Western orientation,  Turkey’s  foreign
policy elites as well as the leading cadres of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) have changed the country’s foreign policy outlook to one of
active engagement with the world. The desire for regional leadership, patronage of the
Muslim  world,  and  presence  in  many  of  the  major  conflicts  in  its  neighbourhood,
however, soon turned into episodes of overstretch, hubris, and foreign policy debacles
(Akkoyunlu et al. 2013). From the “Zero Problems Policy with Neighbours” and Foreign
Minister  Ahmet  Davutoğlu’s  commendable  “Strategic  Depth”  doctrine  to  a  more
belligerent stance towards Israel – temporarily boosting then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
image  in  the  Arab  world  –  to  Turkey’s  involvement  in  the  Syrian  War  and  its
downgrading of diplomatic relations with Egypt it has only been a few years.
2 Parallel to this “rise and fall” dynamic of Turkey’s foreign policy (cf. Bilgin 2015; Öktem
2015; Almassian 2014; Samaan 2013; Keyman 2012), the discourses surrounding actual
policy have gone through comparable cycles. In this paper, we trace the boom and bust
of  Turkey’s  soft  power  discourse,  which  created  a  veritable  dynamic  of  its  own,
particularly among academics and Turkish and American think tanks, and also in the
media more generally.  By doing so,  we seek to understand the extent to which the
discourse on “Turkish soft power” has been used in different ways by different actors
and constituted a discourse of legitimization of AKP rule in the international arena as
well as in Turkey.
3 We suggest that this discourse has gone through cycles of transformation according to
the  uses  and  interpretations  of  actors  investing  in  this  narrative  during  different
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political  episodes,  not  only  during  AKP  rule,  but  also  in  the  period  prior  to  this,
following the end of the Cold War. The Turkish “soft power” discourse resembles an
amorphous body of  overlapping ideas and activities  (also termed hyper-activism or
pro-activism;  cf.  Keyman  2012),  which  eventually  became  generalised  in  academic
circles and think tanks after its  emergence in 2001.  It  is  grounded in the idea that
Turkey’s civilian rule, democratic norms, and economic success are key elements for
the diffusion of a positive image of the country abroad with the aim to create power
capabilities where military power is not a viable option. Our aim is to critically reflect
on how this branding strategy of “Turkey as a model” operated, when and on what
scales it  proceeded, and which goals it  served. We are interested in the generation,
modification, and operation of discourse in a mutually constituted field involving the
academic and think tank community and political actors. We do not consider any one
site of discourse production as the origin of this discourse or the main driver of its
diffusion.  These three poles  can be considered as  interconnected hubs of  discourse
production on Turkish “soft  power” and the “Turkish model” and we can note the
simultaneity  with  which  they  are  promoting  these  discourses.  We  analyze  the
concomitance of discourse production in these different sites in order to highlight the
mutually reinforcing dynamics of this triadic field. Our hypothesis is that academics,
experts  within  Turkish  and  US  think  tanks,  and  AKP  government  officials  have
different interests in the promotion and dissemination of this discourse. This article
paves the way for future research on the actual circulations of resources and agents
structuring the relations between these three poles that we do not have the space to
develop here.
4 On an international  scale,  the  projection  of  soft  power  is  of  course  not  specific  to
Turkey’s  foreign policy.  The very idea of  soft  power originates  from the US within
American foreign policy debate, and particularly from its realist version with Joseph S.
Nye as its  paragon (Nye 2015;  2004;  1990).  From there,  it  was warmly received and
gladly taken up by foreign policy analysts in other emerging middle powers like Brazil,
Russia,  India  and China  (the  BRIC  countries)  as  well  as  by  Turkey.  Meanwhile,  the
concept operates as a political indicator of the international league a country plays its
diplomatic games in: it is aimed at indexing Turkey among other global leaders whose
influence is grounded in soft power. If not on a par with the US, which according to Nye
remains the one and only superpower in the world,  and whether soft or hard (Nye
2015),  Turkey has  been trying to  emulate  the European Union and other  emerging
powers like the BRIC countries.
5 The specificity of the discourse on Turkish “soft power” is that it operates as a multi-
relational discursive tool. This discourse has often pertained to Turkey’s function as a
role model for its relations between the United States/the European Union and a fourth
world  region  for  which  western  appeasement  is  required.  The  Turkish  model  first
emerged with reference to Central Asia after the Cold War. After a period or relative
silence, which attested above all to Turkey’s internal crises in the 1990s, the discourse
made  a  forceful  reappearance  after  9/11  towards  the  Middle  East  (Iğsiz  2014).  It
subsequently peaked with the popular uprisings that shook the Arab world after 2011.
6 In Turkey, the use of “soft power” discourse has served the AKP’s political agenda on
multiple levels.  Laying the emphasis on Turkey’s leadership in the Middle East,  and
increasingly in the Muslim world, the ruling party has been able to reassert itself on
the domestic scene. Discourse on the devotion of the AKP’s external actions to the rise
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of  Turkey’s  place  in  the  world  through  the  promotion  of  its  values  and  the
reconstruction of its national identity epitomizes the way in which foreign policy was
turned  into  a  campaign  argument  for  Erdoğan’s  party  throughout  the  2000s,  and
particularly after the 2011 elections. Beyond its vote-winning aspects, “soft power” and
leadership discourses were also a function and visible manifestation of what especially
pro-AKP  observers  have  called  the  demilitarization  of  Turkey’s  foreign  policy.  It
legitimized the military’s decreasing influence in domestic politics,  while helping to
marginalize the former bureaucratic elites.
7 Even if the “soft power” discourse, as it is discussed here, is not exclusive to the AKP’s
period in power, its central role in the political project of AKP power is. We can even go
a step further and argue that the “soft power” discourse and its role in constituting a
core  linkage  between  two  other  discourses –  domestic  democratization  and
civilianization of  politics –  has  occupied an existential  place in (the now President)
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strategy to establish a hegemonic political system and deepen
his grip on power. As part of the aforementioned triad of interconnected discourses,
the  discourse  of  “soft  power”  helped  obfuscate  global  views  on  the  so-called
civilianization process,  which instead of  democratising  society  led  to  new forms of
authoritarianism,  and in  turn proved detrimental  to  the  positive  promotion of  the
country’s image abroad.
8 Foreign policy failures and growing authoritarianism in Turkey since the beginning of
the  2010s  have  rendered  the  discourse  of  “soft  power”  largely  irrelevant.  The
emergence and diffusion of such a discourse in addition to its potential – if only for a
limited time – to impress foreign policy elites at home and abroad and divert attention
away from more pertinent domestic developments in Turkey remains a highly relevant
question for consideration. Turkey under the AKP has never been the regional order-
setter  that  the  former  Foreign  Minister  Ahmet  Davutoğlu  has  repeatedly  claimed
(Davutoğlu 2013, 2001; cf. Grigoriadis 2010; Murinson 2006). But it was able to project
the discourse of its foreign policy for a few years, during which period the country did
indeed amass symbolical  power in the Middle East  and beyond,  even if,  as  we now
know, this was a very shallow discourse that had the attraction of novelty, but little
power of persuasion in the real world.
9 The empirical basis of this paper has been formed by a set of explorative case studies
involving the institutions active in foreign policy debates and the outputs of thinks
tanks and academic institutions in the period between the early 2000s and September
2014. Members of an interdisciplinary working group on “Turkish Soft Power” carried
out these case studies.1 The research was based on a mixed methods approach with a
particular emphasis on content analysis. This research method is content-sensitive and
is used to describe and quantify phenomena (Miles, Huberman 1994; Denzin, Lincoln
2011; Schreier 2012). Content analysis can be used in an inductive or deductive way,
with the former approach allowing for categories to be derived from the empirical
field. We use this inductive trajectory to locate the places of production of “soft power”
discourse, to understand the conditions of its production, and scrutinize its content.
We have chosen to focus on “soft power”, even though we use the related discourse of
“Turkey as a model” as a comparative frame. As we demonstrate in our analysis, while
“soft  power” is  above all  an academic discourse,  the “model  debate” has  remained
limited in scholarly discussion, despite its significant presence in foreign policy and
public debates on Turkey.
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10 We  worked  with  a  research  design  based  on  the  three  steps  of  preparation,
organization, and reporting. The first stage of the process begins with the selection of
the unit of analysis. In our case, the units of analysis were the texts made available on
the websites of think tanks and government institutions, as well as on Internet search
engines,  such as Google and Google Scholar.  Focusing on the Internet as  a  primary
source of empirical evidence may arguably introduce biases into the process, which are
almost  impossible  to  control.2 In  each  of  these  units  of  analysis,  we  searched  for
literature  referencing  the  two  interrelated  notions  of “Turkish  soft  power”  and
“Turkish model”. We searched texts in both English and in Turkish in order to examine
the nature of the producers and to specify the publics targeted by these discourses.
11 More specifically, concerning the analysis of academic productions and the discourses
of government institutions, we chose to explore regional and thematic categories. This
allowed us to map the regions centralised by this discourse and the themes contained
within it, as well as ascertaining the differences emanating from the divergent nature
of the sources. These themes were visualised with the help of qualitative research and
visualisation tools like Tagxedo.
12 We also have to acknowledge that our focus on terms like “soft power” and “Turkish
model”  constrains  our  analysis  to  foreign  policy  texts.  The  spread  of  the  concept
through other texts dedicated to public policy, cultural matters, Neo-Ottomanism etc.,
which implicitly describe soft power processes and therefore also contribute to this
discursive  thread  without  explicitly  using  the  term  (see,  among  others,  Bingöl
Macdonald 2012), cannot be accounted for in this study. While we are thus limited to
the foreign policy literature in Turkey and abroad that explicitly cites the concept of
“soft  power’,  we do assume that such limitations are manageable for the analytical
purposes of this paper.
13 Due to its exploratory character, the mixed methodology approach taken in this paper
does not allow us to establish a full genealogy of Turkey’s “soft power” discourse. It
rather seeks to provide starting points for the analysis of how Turkey’s “soft power”
discourse has been constructed, which actors have been involved in this construction,
what  its  most  important  contents  have  been,  and  to  what  extent  this  discourse
contributed to the legitimization of AKP power.
14 The paper consists  of  three main sections each corresponding to the three sites  of
discourse production that we identified earlier. We first discuss the academic discourse
of Turkey’s “soft power” as it has been reflected in the global academic literature. We
then examine the role of think-tanks inside and outside Turkey in the dissemination
and adaptation of  the discourse.  Finally,  we look into its  use  among foreign policy
actors  in  Turkey,  particularly  by  AKP  governmental  actors,  specifically  the  former
Foreign  Minister  (now  Prime  Minister)  Ahmet  Davutoğlu  and  the  former  Prime
Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
 
I. The emergence and rise of “soft power” as an
academic discourse
15 Turkey’s “soft power” discourse has been clearly predicated on Joseph Nye’s influential
1990 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. Yet, it has taken more
than a decade for Nye’s ideas to trickle down into the foreign policy debate, which may
The rise and fall of Turkey’s soft power discourse
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 21 | 2015
4
have probably required a reminder in the shape of Nye’s (2004) follow-up publication,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. When we examine the period from 2001
through  academic  publications  made  available  on  Google  Scholar3,  i.e.  the  period
corresponding to the AKP in power, we see a very slow rise in the number of published
academic  papers  (in  Turkish  and  English  combined)  on  Turkey’s  “soft  power”,
beginning  in  2005,  accelerating  in  2009,  and  reaching  close  to  80  papers  in  2013
(Figure 1).
 
Figure 1: Academic articles containing the term “Turkish soft power”
Compiled by Julien Paris. Based on 371 Google Scholar entries on Turkey’s “soft power”.
16 This general trend is not surprising. Turkey’s foreign policy actors became increasingly
engaged in world politics and more visible, particularly after Ahmet Davutoğlu took
over the office of the Foreign Ministry in 2009.  With the increased outputs of  pro-
government think-tanks like SETA [Siyaset,  Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları  Vakfı,  the
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research] and through gatekeepers, such
as Ibrahim Kalın (see box below), soft power-related terms gained much wider currency
in  foreign  policy  outlets.  These  gatekeepers  are  characterised  by  their  ability  to
produce  the  narrative  of  “soft  power” while  participating  in  the  construction  of  a
complex  institutionalized  system  of  public  and  private  partnerships  charged  with
promoting it. Their circulation in Turkish and American think tanks and the position of
their fields of expertise in public institutions is indicative of the personal interests that
may become invested in the promotion of  this  discourse. They have also published
academic or near-academic papers in journals such as Insight Turkey and Perceptions,
and the journal of SAM [Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi, the Center for Strategic Research],
the think tank of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
Ibrahim Kalın graduated from Georgetown University and is a specialist in Islamic
studies  and  International  Relations.  He  was  one  of  the  first  opinion  leaders  to
promote the discourse of “soft power” from as early as 2006 in an article published
in Zaman (Kalın Feb. 24, 2006, see also Kalın 2011). At the time of publication he was
the founder and general coordinator of SETA, a leading pro-government think tank.
In 2010, he was appointed to the Coordination Agency for Public Diplomacy [Kamu
Diplomasisi  Koordinatörlüğü,  KDK],  launched under the Prime Minister in order to
coordinate government efforts to promote Turkey’s image. Between 2009 and 2012
he served as Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Erdogan, before becoming the
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Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Minister. In 2014, he became the spokesman
for President Erdoğan.
17 It  is  worth  comparing  the  evident  presence  of  “soft  power”  discourse  in  academic
works  to  the  related  discourse  of  the  “Turkish  model”.  While  “soft  power”  was
mentioned in 371 articles from 2001, references to the “Turkish Model” can only be
found in 49 entries for the same research period (Figure 2). There is no comparative
upward trend in the number of publications, even though there is a significant hike
between 2011 and 2013,  suggesting the start  of  an academic debate on the role for
Turkey as a model for the future of countries destabilised by the Arab Spring. This
number can be expected to remain at a relatively high level as the output of papers is
likely to rise given the current political context and the failure of the discourse on the
“Turkish Model”,  particularly in Syria,  and following the Gezi protests  in May-June
2013 and the breakdown of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey. For a comparison,
please also consult Figures 3 and 4.
 
Figure 2. Academic articles on the “Turkish Model”
Compiled by Julien Paris using Google Scholar. Based on 49 entries on the “Turkish model”.
18 In terms of  the content of  these articles,  a  perfunctory reading suggests  that  most
academic papers on soft power involve more than one country, that is to say, they deal
with Turkey’s “soft power” in a particular world region combined with the role of the
United States or Europe. Turkey’s “soft power” discourse appears to be connected to
the  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  European  Union,  to
influence parts of the world beyond their direct control via a more trusted regional
leader, i.e. Turkey.
19 We can further explore the content of these publications by looking at the titles and
words used in them. Figure 3 conveys a sense of the main constituents of “soft power”
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discourse. The results do tend to surprise to some extent as some of the key concepts
one would expect to find – democracy, equality, justice – are largely absent from the
studies. Rather, the most commonly used concepts are “foreign policy” and “foreign
relations”, and the most frequently referenced regions are the “Middle East”, followed
by the “European Union” (as a composite of “Europe” and “Union”),  and the “Arab
world”. In terms of vocabulary, the following words are widely used: security, economy,
strategy, culture, and energy. These results seem to corroborate the idea according to
which the Turkish “soft  power” discourse,  as reflected in academic papers,  is  more
concerned with promoting stability and security and with Turkey’s role as moderating
influence particularly in conflict-ridden third party contexts.
 
Figure 3: Frequency of key words used in academic publications on “Turkish soft power”
Compiled by Julien Paris. Based on the titles of 365 papers referenced between 2001 and
2014 and translated into English. The words “soft power”, “Turkish”, and “Turkey” have
been excluded from the table due to their high frequency of occurrence.
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Figure 4: Frequency of key words used in academic publications on “the Turkish Model”
Compiled by Julien Paris. Word cloud based on the titles of 49 documents referenced
between1978 and 2014 and translated into English. The words “Turkish model”, “Turkish”,
and “Turkey” have been excluded from the table, due to their high frequency of
occurrence.
20 A comparison between the content  of  “soft  power”  discourse  and “Turkish model”
discourse here is quite insightful (Figure 3 and Figure 4).  The former is much more
widely spread both in terms of world regions and conceptual references with Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa represented. “Turkish model” discourse, as represented in
Figure 4, is concerned with democracy and democratization in the Middle East after the
Arab spring with extensive references made to Islam, Islamism, and secularism, and the
role of Turkey as moderator. This figure thus confirms our working hypothesis that a
central dimension of the “Turkish model” discourse is its role within US and EU debates
concerning Turkey’s role in the Middle East after the popular uprisings in the Arab
world. One of the possible explanations for the growing importance of Turkish “soft
power” and “model” debates in the 2000s may be the increasing mutual dependence
between  academic  institutions,  thinks  tanks,  and  government  agencies.  This
interdependence  seems  to  have  contributed  to  the  blurring  of  lines  between  non-
partisan scholarly research, academic research with a (hidden) political agenda, and
outright partisan work to the point of devaluing the academic endeavour as a whole.
 
II. Turkish and American think tanks advocating for
the “Turkish model”
21 As  we  established  in  section  one,  “soft  power”  discourse  and  the  “Turkish  model”
debate  are  two distinct  if  interrelated  discourses  on  Turkey  and its  foreign policy.
Discursive developments since the 1990s provides us with an insight into the workings
of  US-Turkey  bilateral  relations  and  the  mode  whereby  this  field  of  expertise  is
structured in these two countries.
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22 The rise of the “Turkish model” discourse is, above all, a product of the geopolitical
reconfigurations  of  the  post-Cold  War  era.  During  the  Cold  War,  Washington’s
containment policy against Moscow was defined by a reactive doctrine, described by
the International  Relations  (IR)  theorist  Georges  Kennan as  an “adroit  and vigilant
application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political
points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy” (Kennan 1947).
Due to its location, Turkey represented one of these geostrategic points and maintained
strong  economic  and  military  ties  with  Western  institutions,  such  as  NATO,  and
especially with the United States. The end of the Cold War, hence, constituted a critical
period of uncertainty for Turkish decision makers, as it put into question the “strategic
rentier” (Bozdemir 1991) position of their country.  In the same period, Turkey also
experienced  two  main  setbacks  to  its  European  ambitions  in  1987  and  1989.4 As  a
countermovement to these challenges, Ankara was also able to take advantage of the
implosion of the Soviet Union to reaffirm its strategic importance on the international
scene and especially to the United States.
23 The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the independence of five Turkic republics in
Central  Asia  and  the  establishment  of  new  states  in  the  Caucasus.  American  and
Turkish foreign policy actors quickly labelled Turkey as a model for these countries on
the basis of three elements: firstly, Turkey was seen as a model of development for
Central  Asian  economies  willing  to  embrace  capitalism  after  seventy  years  of  a
centrally  planned  soviet  economy;  secondly,  it  was  suggested  as  a  model  of
democratization;  and  thirdly,  Turkey  was  represented  as  a  secular  model  of
modernization for Muslim-majority countries, unlike other actors such as Iran (Aydın
2003; Balcı 2005). In addition, the underlying argument of shared history and culture
between Turkey and the Central Asian Republics coincided with Huntington’s emphasis
on civilizations in world politics, an influential perspective among decision makers and
analysts in the US, particularly under Presidents George H. W. Bush and later George W.
Bush. This may have thus played a role in the popularity of the notion of the “Turkish
model” during the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that Turkey
lacked the capacity to fulfil this role due to its own domestic political and economic
instability.
24 Despite the disillusionment over Turkey’s failure as role model for the Central Asian
states, the idea of a Turkish model had spread to other areas by the late 1990s. As in the
case of Central Asia, it was possible to witness the development of this discourse in
regions where US interests were at stake and where the State Department remained
wary of the influence of non-allied states. While the “Turkish model” was promoted in
Central Asia to counter Iranian influence and isolate the former Soviet republics from
Moscow, in the Muslim world it was promoted as an alternative to the attraction of
political Islam. In a speech held in 1999 at the Washington Institute, the Turkish Prime
Minister Bülent Ecevit stated:
Turkey  is,  I  believe,  a  model  for  Islamic  countries  (…)  I  believe  that  Turkey’s
example  has  played  an  important  role  in  this  respect,  because  the  Turkish
experiment  has  proven  that  Islam  can  be  compatible  with  modernity,  with
secularism, and with democracy. (Ecevit 1999)
25 It is important to note that Ecevit gave this speech in Washington with the intention of
strengthening  Turkey’s  economic  partnership  with  the  US  after  the  devastating
earthquake that struck the country earlier in the year. In the American context, the
welcome reception  of  Ecevit’s  words  was  facilitated  by  Washington’s  increasing
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concern about the potential threats posed by “Islamist terrorism’. The two attacks on
the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam in the previous year led to strategic
discussions on the Muslim world and Turkey’s role as “pivotal state” within it.5
 
Figure 5: American think-tank publications on “Turkish soft power” and “Turkish model”
Compiled by Jean-Baptiste Le Moulec and Yohanan Benhaim in February 2014. Research
based on the websites of eight leading US think tanks specializing in foreign policy: the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Council of Foreign Affairs, Brookings
Institutions, the Washington Institute, the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), the Middle East Forum, the Woodrow Wilson Centre, and the Jewish
Institute for National Security. Totals pertain to the whole period between 1999 and
2014.
26 The  geographic  shift  from  Central  Asia  to  the  Islamic  world  correlates  to  the
reorientation  of  Turkey’s  globally  promoted  identity  from  Turkishness  to  (Turkish
Sunni) Muslimhood. It also suggests that this shift is part of the structural pattern of
Turkish-American  relations,  which  develops  in  response  to  the  international  and
domestic  challenges  faced  by  the  two  partners.  The  “Turkish  model”  cycle  is
consequently  an  expression  of  the  evolving  nature  of  this  bilateral  relation.  The
post-9/11  international  context  in  combination  with  the  first  AKP  government  in
Turkey  and  the  US  invasion  of  Iraq,  opened  a  new  phase  in  the  evolution  of  the
“Turkish model” discourse. Here, it is worth drawing attention to the frequency with
which this concept appeared in the publications of leading American foreign policy
think  tanks  (Figure 5).  The  debate  on  Turkey’s  role  model  status  was  at  the  time
oriented  towards  finding  a  resolution  to  the  so-called  “clash  of  civilisations”  with
Turkey positioned as a “bridge country between West and East” (Iğsiz, 2014). In the late
2000s, the debate progressed and the first reports and articles on “Turkish soft power”
were published, alongside the development of the discussion on the “Neo-Ottomanist”
reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. With the Arab uprisings at the beginning of
2011, the debate on the “Turkish model” peaked reaching a new level. The majority of
articles  debated whether Turkey and the AKP could represent  a  model  for  Tunisia,
Libya or Egypt and their respective Islamist parties. Since mid-2012, discourses on the
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“Turkish model” and “Turkish soft power” seem to have overlapped, albeit in the form
of  a  critical  discussion  against  the  viability  of  both  approaches.  In  particular,  the
deteriorating situation in Syria and Ankara’s inability to provide a constructive answer
to the crisis have called into question their relevance. The harsh repression of the Gezi
Park demonstrations by the Turkish police in spring 2013, triggered further critical
publications describing the AKP government’s increasingly authoritarian stance as a
threat to Turkey’s stability and influence in the Middle East, as well as its reliability as
an ally of the US. Finally, the AKP’s authoritarian shift and its decision to terminate the
peace process with the Kurdish movement in Turkey has led even the most proactive
supporters of the ruling party to abandon the discourse on Turkey’s “soft power”.
27 The study of the publications of leading Turkish think tanks is  enlightening in this
context. When we compare the occurrence of the concepts of “model” and “soft power”
we see that the notion of the “Turkish model” still dominates (Figure 6). It is possible to
witness a similar and even more accentuated trend in American think tank production.
To explain the scope of  the debate on the “Turkish model” among American think
tanks we can hypothesise that beyond Turkey, it is the American model that is at stake
in an important part of this literature: the promotion of democracy, capitalism, and
secularism via the example of Turkey is first and foremost a way for the United States
to promote its interests.  This has been especially true of the praise of the “Turkish
model” in American think tanks by neo-cons of the George W. Bush administration like
Paul  Wolfowitz.  During  a  speech  at  the  Fifth  Turgut  Özal  Memorial  Lecture  at  the
Washington Institute in March 20026,  a few months after the beginning of the ISAF
operation in Afghanistan, Wolfowitz stated:
In the United States, we understand that Turkey remains on the frontlines of the
war on terror.  And we also understand that Turkey is  a model for those in the
Muslim world who have aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity. Turkey
gives us an example of the reconciliation of religious belief with modern secular
democratic institutions.
28 This relationship between US foreign policy and the discourse of the “Turkish model”
at a time when the neo-cons were promoting a vision of American hegemony in the
Middle East, contributed to paranoia in Turkey about the influence of Washington in
the region and its alleged support of the AKP government. However, such judgement
fails  to account for the complexity of  this discourse,  which cannot be reduced to a
simplistic expression of the domination of the centre over the periphery. Indeed, the
producers  of  discourses  on  Turkey  within  Turkish  and  American  think  tanks  are
characterized by their mobility. There is a remarkable pattern of circulation between
different  institutions  located both within the  United States  and in  Turkey.  A  rapid
glance at the analysts working in American think tanks on Turkey indicates that the
majority are of Turkish origin and move between universities and think tanks in the US
and  Turkey.  Some  analysts  could  qualify  as  gatekeepers  of  this  particular  field  of
expertise as they have been responsible for producing reports on Turkey for several
American  think  tanks  since  the  beginning  of  the  2000s.  In addition,  this  system is
characterised by its permeability and especially by its connections with academic and
political fields, which further enhances the circulation of actors and thoughts within
this system of knowledge production.
29 This  articulation between the political  field and the local  context  also explains  the
comparative differences between publications on Turkey produced by American and
Turkish  think  tanks.  When  the  first  revolts  started  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt,  Turkish
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officials refrained from promoting the vision of Turkey as a model.  In a conference
organized by the Abant Platform7 in December 2011, Erşat Hürmüzlü, the Middle East
special advisor to the then Turkish President Abdullah Gül, stated that Turkey should
not be considered as a model, but as a source of inspiration to neighbouring countries
(Radikal December 3, 2011). This insistence on the fact that Turkey should not represent
a model for the countries experiencing the “Arab Spring” may have been based on the
determination not  to  repeat  the mistakes  made in  Central  Asia  in  the 1990s,  when
Turkish foreign policy failed to live up to its ambitions of regional leadership.
30 This  cautious  attitude  also  marked  an  attempt  to  promote  Turkey’s  “soft  power”
capabilities. Contrary to the model narrative, “soft power” discourse promoted Turkey
as a dynamic player in regional politics, rather than as a country distinguished by its
essence as Turkish or Muslim. Laying the emphasis on Turkey’s “soft power” could be
interpreted as an expression of preference of what Turkey does rather than what it is,
as remained the case until the authoritarian and identitarian turn in Turkey after the
2011 elections.  This was also a way of enhancing its actions and autonomy towards
other  major  actors  in  world  politics  such  as  the  United  States.  Indeed,  this  also
constituted the main paradox of this discourse: while the “model” and “soft power”
discourses were framed by the mutual interests of Turkey’s American ally, one of the
main sources of Ankara’s popularity continued to reside in its ability to emancipate
itself  from Washington and act  as  an independent power vis-a-vis  Israel.  While the
debate  on the “Turkish model”  within Turkish think tanks was oriented towards a
Turkish-speaking audience, the “Turkish soft power” debate was conducted in English
in order to reach an international public (Figure 6). This discrepancy allows for some
preliminary conjectures to be made: Turkey’s foreign policy actors have been cautious
to avoid the model debate in outputs geared towards an English-language audience,
which of course also includes readers in the Arab and Muslim world where Turkey has
been  seeking  to  build-up  its  power  capacities.  For  the  Turkish-speaking  audience,
however, Turkey’s role as model has been used much more permissively and sometimes
in a nationalist context.
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Figure 6: Language used in Turkish think tank publications on “Turkish soft power” and the “Turkish
model”
Compiled by Yohanan Benhaim in April 2014. Based on research on the websites of seven of
the leading foreign policy think tanks in Turkey (ORSAM, USAK, TESEV, SETA, SDE, TEPAV,
BILGESAM).
31 Finally, “Turkish model” and “Turkish soft power” discourses are not equally dispersed
among Turkish think tanks. Indeed, TEPAV and SETA represent the two think tanks are
at the forefront of promoting the idea of Turkish “soft power”. This is certainly not a
coincidence.  TEPAV  is  the  think  tank  of  the  Turkish  Union  of  the  Chamber  of
Commerce,  a body that is  benefiting from the development of trading state foreign
policy  (Kirişçi  2009)  and willing  to  develop a  positive  image of  Turkey in  order  to
attract foreign investments. SETA on the other hand is known in the domestic arena
and especially in Washington for its strong connections to the AKP government and its
foreign policy.  The entangled relationship between economic and political  interests
and think tank productions also serves as a reminder of the lack of autonomy of a large
part of the Turkish think tank community from the state. Such a lack of autonomy is, of
course, a phenomenon not limited to Turkey alone. Yet, since the authoritarian shift of
the AKP government in 2011, it has become particularly accentuated. Therefore, the
growing  importance  of  “Turkish  model”  discourses  in  Turkish  and American  think
tanks seems to be directly related to the fact that some of the experts promoting this
discourse were committed to the foreign and domestic political agendas of Ankara and
Washington.
 
III. The promotion of “soft power” discourse by Turkish
foreign policy actors and the AKP government
32 Having  discussed  the  emergence  of  “soft  power”  discourse  in  academia  and  think-
tanks, we shall now turn to examine its use by Turkish foreign policy actors and the
AKP government. Specifically, we will focus on the use of this concept in the speeches
of the former Foreign Minister (and current Prime Minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the
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former Prime Minister (and current President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. We chose these
two  actors  as  they  are  the  most  authoritative  actors  of  the  AKP  government  and
Turkish foreign policy abroad. We will firstly examine the presence of the term “soft
power” on the websites of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).8 In a second
step, we will submit Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speeches to closer scrutiny. In
both  cases,  the  content  associated  with  “soft  power”  is  shallow,  but  a  remarkable
distinction can be made between a language concerned with IR theory on the one hand
(Ahmet Davutoğlu), and one that is much more openly nationalist, imperialist, and pan-
Islamist on the other hand (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan). On the website of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s “soft power” is primarily characterised as consisting of three
key characteristics: Democracy, Economy and Trade, and European Soft Power, with the first
two voiced consistently and independently of the audience and location of its author.
Other  constituent  elements  or  sources  of  Turkey’s  “soft  power”  are  presented  as
Turkey’s liberal visa regime, it’s inspiration for and influence in the Muslim world, the
role of history, and Turkey’s actions as an ’emerging donor’. In (only) one background
paper,  the  key  actors  of  “soft  power”  are  mentioned  as  the  Turkish  Radio  and
Television  Corporation’s  (TRT)  foreign  language  programmes,  Turkish  Airlines,  the
Turkish  Development  and  Cooperation  Agency  (TIKA),  and  the  Presidency  for
Expatriate Turks.
33 A truly intriguing aspect of the “soft power” debate, which may also hint at the rather
wide applicability of the term by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ahmet Davutoğlu,
is  perceptible in the emphasis  on a new discourse and diplomatic style in Turkey’s
Foreign Policy in the following quote:
We  do  not  make  threats...  (but  use)  a  language  that  prioritizes  civil-economic
power. (Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010).
34 Davutoğlu seeks to distinguish himself from earlier more conventional forms of foreign




35 The following two quotes illustrate the consistent references to Turkey’s democracy
and its assumed power of attraction for countries in its neighbourhood:
We are cognizant of the fact that our democracy is our biggest soft power. (Ahmet
Davutoğlu at a meeting with EU Ambassadors, May 8, 2009).
Though there is ample room for improvement, our democracy inspires many in our
neighbourhood and constitutes the backbone of our growing soft power. (Naci Koru
during a lecture at Stanford University’s Business School, February 13, 2013).
36 The commitment to the advancement of democracy and economic development is also
apparent  in  Ahmet  Davutoğlu’s  interview  with  the  American  University  in  Cairo
Review, conducted before President Mohammed Mursi’s ascent to power. He combines
many of the sources of Turkey’s “soft power” in one single sweep, prioritizing location,
economy, culture, and democracy.
Our geostrategic location, booming economy, ability to understand different social
and  cultural  dynamics  in  a  vast  geography  and  commitment  to  advance
democracy...  domestically  and  internationally  are  all  important  assets…  The  key
word defining Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries is not “hegemony” but
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“mutual  cooperation”.  (Ahmet  Davutoğlu,  American  University  of  Cairo  Review,
February 13, 2012).
37 Note here that Davutoğlu also rejects allegations that Turkey may be interfering in
Arab affairs.
 
European and Turkish soft power
38 Turkey-EU  relations  and  European  “soft  power”  as  both  a  condition  and  result  of
Turkey’s prospective membership is also prominent on the MFA’s website. However, it
is crucial to consider that all speeches and articles referring to this relationship are
geared exclusively towards European audiences. One exception aside, MFA documents
do not mention Turkey’s relationship with the EU when audiences outside the EU are in
question.
39 The relation between Turkish and European “soft power” is well represented in the
below quote,  which is  also used verbatim in several  other speeches in  the samples
taken of Davutoğlu and others:
Europe and Turkey… share a truly common vision for the future of our continent: A
Europe  that  strengthens  its  soft  power and  advances  its  universal  values;  that
promotes diversity: that is much more influential in global politics. (Davutoğlu
during a speech at the Nueva Economia Forum in Madrid, November 16, 2009).
40 The importance of Turkey for the EU and vice versa can also be found in the speeches
of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan:
Turkey’s EU membership will  considerably increase its soft power and appeal in
expanding  civil  and  human  rights  in  the  Islamic  world.  …  Turkey  will  become
Europe’s gateway to a wider world and a portal for our common values and shared
ideals that will have a more receptive audience in the Middle East. (Ali Babacan,
October 2, 2007).
41 Babacan discusses the role of Turkey’s EU membership as a source of “soft power” for
the EU as well as for Turkey by employing the “gateway to the Middle East” metaphor.
In this reading, Turkey’s “soft power” will rise as the direct result of EU membership,
Turkey  will  become  a  hub  of  attraction  for  the  Middle  East  and  will  assume
responsibility for “translating” European values to the Muslim world. In exchange, the
EU will  be able to better understand and cooperate with the Middle East thanks to
Turkey’s “more receptive audience in the Middle East”.
 
Beyond Europe
42 As  one  would  expect,  MFA  representatives  adjust  their  examples  to  suit  their
audiences. While they do not refer to the European Union when speaking in Brazil or
Africa for example, they do emphasise other issues such as Turkey’s role as a donor of
development assistance and its liberal visa regime.
We  used  our  visa  policy  as  a  tool  of  increasing  soft  power  capability,  lifting  visa
requirements with more than 30 countries in the last 5 years.  In addition to its
political and cultural benefits, these agreements boosted our tourism. (Naci Koru,
during a meeting with Turkish Honorary Consuls in North and South America, April
15, 2013).
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43 Finally, a recurring theme is the historical foundations of Turkey’s “soft power”. An
MFA  paper  on  Turkey  and  NATO  explains  Turkey’s  importance  for  NATO  in  the
following fashion:
Turkey mobilizes its  “soft  power” by means of  using its  deep historical  ties with
populations and countries in the wide geography where NATO acts.
44 The  quote  here  refers  to  NATO’s  missions  in  Bosnia,  Kosova,  Macedonia,  and
Afghanistan, conflicts in which Turkey has indeed been able to use its religious and
cultural identity to establish relations of trust with local Muslim populations.
 
A closer look at Davutoğlu’s speeches
45 Based on an analysis of all 75 publicly available speeches of the Foreign Minister,10 we
can see some degree of  overlap with the “soft  power” discourse of  the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in addition to some points of deviation. Figure 7 represents his core
vocabulary.  While  the  economy  and  cooperation  tops  the  list,  the  emphasis  on
democracy is comparably less pronounced than on the ministry’s website, and it is used
with the same frequency as Islam.
 
Figure 7: Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s core vocabulary – Top 15 Keywords
Compiled by Kerem Öktem. Based on 75 speeches made by Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu.
46 Davutoğlu’s vision emerges as less Euro-centric and is certainly not geared towards the
promotion of democracy. Economic and political cooperation and security are at the
heart of his engagement with the world, not democracy or the rule of law. There is no
reference to human rights, and most interestingly neither to the explicit terms “soft
power”,  nor  “strategic  depth”.  His  speeches,  however,  can  be  seen  as
operationalizations of these concepts, which are implicit in his public statements.
47 Seeking  to  break  down  Davutoğlu’s  understanding  of  Turkish  foreign  policy,  the
frequency of city names referred to in his speeches are examined (Figure 8).11 What is
truly striking here,  is  that the most often cited city by the Foreign Minister in his
programmatic speeches is  in fact Istanbul.  Considering that Ankara is  the country’s
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capital  and  only  comes  second,  a  strong  emotional  attachment  to  Istanbul  as  the
symbol of something larger than the Turkish Republic and its capital may be detected
here.  Istanbul  was  the  capital  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and,  at  least  in  Davutoğlu’s
mental  map,  is  the leading city  of  Islamic  cosmopolitanism,  the desired conceptual
image Turkey wishes to represent to the world. The faint hint of the capital of the
Islamic  Caliphate  is  inherent  in  the  notion  of  Muslim cosmopolitanism.  Davutoğlu
himself has never explicitly talked about the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate
as a  foreign policy goal,  but  several  commentators in newspapers close to the AKP
government,  such  as  Yeni  Akit  and  Yeni  Şafak,  have  made  this  connection  quite
aggressively (i.e. Köse August 26, 2014).
48 The  political  geography  and  the  ideological  frame  emerging  from  this  analysis  is
compelling: it is an extended universe of overlapping spheres of influence with Istanbul
at its centre. After Ankara, Brussels and New York come third and fourth, reflecting the
relative importance of Turkey’s two leading allies. The remainder are a mix of capital
cities located in Turkey’s neighbourhood with Jerusalem, Baku, Cairo,  Sarajevo,  and
Damascus the most cited. Their relative importance accurately reflects the key areas of
Turkish foreign policy interests under the Justice and Development Party, ranging from
the  issue  of  the  occupation  of  Palestine  to  close  petro-ethnic  ties  with  Azerbaijan,
criticism  of  Egypt  after  the  ouster  of  President  Mursi  and  the  suppression  of  the
Muslim  Brotherhood,  the  “emotive”  relation  with  the  Muslim  element  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the conflict with Syria’s President Basher Al Assad.
49 The mental map of Ahmet Davutoğlu,  visualized in Figure 8,  also reminds us of the
continuities  and ruptures  of  Turkey’s  foreign policy  and its  strategic alliances.  The
United States and the European Union have been strategic allies since the end of World
War Two – if now contested and disliked – while Azerbaijan became an ally in the 1990s
due to successful Azeri policies based on ethnic ties and energy dependence. Jerusalem,
representing  both  occupied  Palestine  and  Israel’s  policies,  is  a  core  theme  of
Davutoğlu’s Islamist ideology, while Sarajevo stands for the re-imagining of Turkey’s
sphere of influence through a Neo-Ottomanist and Pan-Islamist conceptualisation of
geopolitics.
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Figure 8: Cities mentioned in Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speeches
Compiled by Kerem Öktem. Based on 75 speeches by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.
 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister
50 Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan’s  speeches  differ  from  those  found  on  the  MFA  website  in
language, content, and emotional appeal. His language is emotive, suffused with neo-
Ottomanist references and adorned with nationalist fervour. “Soft power” emerges as
one of many ideas, which he appears to use with relatively little interest in detail. In
two out of three speeches, he highlights the agencies under his control as prime actors
of Turkey’s “soft power”.
In the last eight and a half years, we have emphasised this soft power dimension in
foreign policy. Inspired by the unique resources of our history, our culture, and our
civilisation, we are engaged in a hard struggle to have an impact on processes, to
contribute  to  solutions  for  all  questions  on  the  regional  and  global  scale.  ...  In
addition,  we disseminate Turkey’s  soft  power,  Turkey’s  message of  peace to the
whole world through TIKA, the Yunus Emre Institutes, the TRT, the Presidency of
Turks Abroad and Related Communities. (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at
the conference of trade attachés, April 25, 2011).
51 In  another  context,  Erdoğan  extends  the  term  “soft  power”  to  re-frame  Ottoman
history as an example of flexible power:
Next to hard power, there is now soft power or with a more correct term, “flexible
power’.  ...  The  term  flexible  power  may  be  a  new,  modern  term,  but  we  have
believed throughout our history that the pen is mightier than the sword and the
doors that cannot be opened by the sword can be opened with a pen. Our historical
buildings, scattered over three continents, our tokens from the past, are the most
concrete expressions of this. (Erdoğan at the 144th year celebrations of Turkey’s Red
Crescent Society, August 11, 2012).
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52 And finally, at a Meeting of the High Council for Science and Technology, he distances
himself from the idea of Turkey as a solely “soft power” actor and calls for the rise of a
national arms industry with the potential to amass greater deterrent power.
A soft power claim that is not supported by deterrent power is only talk. Turkey is
now in a period in which potentials are transformed to action. (Meeting of the High
Council for Science and Technology, January 15, 2013).
53 The  three  quotes  suggest  primarily  that  for  Erdoğan,  “soft  power”  is  not  an
indispensable ingredient of his political vocabulary: “soft power” can become “flexible
power”, and “flexible power” can become “deterrent power”. In Erdoğan’s speeches, it
is the overarching importance of the Ottoman Empire and the role of civilization (read
religion) that makes for Turkeys “unique” place in the world.
54 All  in  all,  the  Turkish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  as  represented  in  this  sample,
perceives  Turkey’s  “soft  power”  as  emanating  largely  from  Turkey’s  democratic
credentials,  its  vibrant  economy,  and  its  relations  with  the  European  Union,  even
though the  latter  seems to  be  an  argument  reserved for  European audiences  only.
Turkey is represented as a responsible, “virtuous” power (former President Abdullah
Gül)  that  mobilizes  history,  culture,  identity,  and  geographic  location  to  advance
democracy and the economy in Turkey and abroad. References to Turkish aspirations
for regional leadership are muted and the language is generally diplomatic and well
considered.  Significantly,  the  terminology  of  “soft  power” is  employed  coherently
throughout  the  research  period  and  it  is  only  the  references  to  Europe  that  have
declined in frequency over the last few years. With this quality, the MFA website stands
in contrast to both the public speeches of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, which depict
Turkey as a civilizational power particularly in the Balkans, and to the speeches of then
Prime Minister Erdoğan, which are steeped in neo-Ottomanist references, nationalist
fervour, shifting terminology, and changing realpolitik choices. Intriguingly absent is
any reference to  the United States,  which we earlier  identified as  one of  the main
drivers of the Turkish model discourse.
55 Since the Gezi  protests in May and June 2013,  much of  the foreign policy language
emanating from Ankara has, of course, changed considerably. This change has been
much more profound in the case of Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) Ahmet
Davutoğlu, who made a full volte-face from a language of win-win thinking and soft
power to zero-sum games and strongmen aggression. In comparison to Davutoğlu’s IR
language,  Erdoğan’s  language  comes  across  as  consistently  uninfluenced  by  “soft
power” discourse, remaining steadfastly nationalist on the one hand, and committed to
Realpolitik in the extreme (or perhaps more accurately, to the politics of mere survival)
on the other hand.
 
Conclusion
56 In this paper, we have sought to trace the emergence and the rise and fall of Turkey’s
“soft power” discourse, and its differential uses by various actors since the beginning of
the  millennium.  We  have  located  the  historical  roots  of  the  “model”  discourse  in
Turkey’s re-orientation towards Central Asia and the Caucasus after the end of the Cold
War and situated its re-emergence with an even more extended geo-strategic vision
under the Justice and Development Party in the early 2000s. We have highlighted the
prominence of  American interests  in the Turkish model  discourse and outlined the
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changing  interdependencies  between  Turkey,  the  United  States,  and  the  European
Union in  the  formation of  the  discourse.  We have  flagged the  role  of  Turkish  and
American  think  tanks  in  the  process  of  discourse  formation  and  the  centrality  of
Turkish gatekeepers within this system. And finally, we have shown the overlapping
and contradicting elements in this complex discourse involving a range of Turkish and
global actors from decision-makers to think-tanks and academics.
57 The discourse under scrutiny is not only complex, shallow, and at times contradictory,
it also demonstrates the extent to which different actors within it have been able to
advance their own goals by using it, even if their goals have often been irreconcilable.
Particularly  at  the  height  of  the  AKP’s  power,  “soft  power”  discourse  created  a
discursive space for the regional autonomy of Turkey that was not necessarily in the
interests  of  American  foreign  policy  actors,  who  above  all  thought  about  Turkey’s
“model role” in self-interested terms, seeking the promotion of American power in the
“Arab Spring”  countries.  This  Turkish quest  for  autonomy and regional  hegemony,
however, was frustrated by the course of the Arab uprisings and the robustness of the
autocratic  non-Islamist  regimes  in  Egypt  and  Syria.  It  was  further  undermined  by
Turkey’s  domestic  challenges  and  the  recent  authoritarian  turn  of  the  AKP
government. Turkey’s stellar rise in the Middle East, chided particularly by American
and Turkish realists as being too thinly spread and too idealistic, has long surpassed its
peak. The consequences of the Syrian conflict, which now play out within the territory
of  Turkey,  and  domestic  challenges  alongside  a  volatile  economy  are  dampening
Turkey’s newfound pride and hegemonic ambitions in the region.
58 With the benefit of hindsight,  we now see that the discourses of “model” and “soft
power”  were  shallow  and  by  no  means  reflective  of  the  real  power  capabilities  of
Turkey. Despite the hype created around AKP Turkey that continued well into 2011 and
even beyond, Turkey never really came close to becoming a “regional hegemon” or an
“order setter” in the Middle East. What Davutoğlu and many foreign policy analysts
almost succeeded in establishing, however, was a moment of discursive hegemony, in
which an informed foreign policy analysis  on Turkey could not  be written without
ample references to fashionable concepts such as “zero problems with neighbours” or
“strategic  depth”,  even though its  pan-Islamist  and imperialist  underpinnings  have
been discussed in detail (Özkan 2014).
59 As  a  final  point,  we  would  like  to  draw  attention  to  the  role  of  academia  in  the
promotion and diffusion of the “Turkish model” and “soft power” discourses. In this
paper, we have discussed the generation, modification, and operation of a discourse in
a  mutually  constituted  field  involving  academia,  the  think-tank  community,  and
foreign policy actors. Neither think tanks, nor foreign policy actors have a mission to
deconstruct, enlighten, explain and elucidate power relations, and indeed they have
not done so in this case. Academics, at least in the academic tradition the authors of
this paper adhere to, do have such a mission. As students of Turkey’s foreign policy we
are not able to escape the chains of  the overarching – if  not hegemonic anymore –
discourses  that  shape  the  field  we  are  studying. What  we  can  do,  however,  is  to
maintain a critically informed perspective that allows us to see the connectivities and
dependencies that the Turkish “soft power” discourse has created. In this sense, the
study of  Turkey’s  “soft  power” discourse and its  “model” role also raises questions
about  the  independence  of  academic  thinking  in  an  intellectual  environment
structured by overlapping and sometimes contradicting political interests and power
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plays. A significant section of a generation of authors on Turkey’s foreign policy have
written their papers on Turkey’s rise as “soft power” without such second thoughts.
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NOTES
1. The working group met at IFEA from December 2013 to March 2014. The authors would like to
extend their thanks to Julien Paris, whose Google Scholar research has made a major empirical
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contribution  to  this  paper.  Gabrielle  Angey,  Élise  Massicard,  Jean-Baptiste  Le  Moulec,  Merve
Özdemirkıran, and Jean-François Polo have been of great assistance in the preparation of the
empirical references and the broader intellectual framework of this paper.
2. Two methodological biases need to be taken into consideration here: firstly, the self-selection
on official websites; and secondly, the self-selection of research engines. To analyse the speeches
of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu for instance, we downloaded all the speeches available on
the Foreign Ministry’s website. The selection, therefore, is not based on all speeches Davutoğlu
has ever given, but on those speeches selected for the website. As for the second bias, we worked
with Internet search engines, such as Google Scholar, which have their own algorithms and data
gathering  methodologies,  which  we  cannot  explain  or  criticise,  but  only  take  as  a  point  of
departure for the survey exercise.
3. We used Google Scholar for this search, as this is  the most widely used search engine for
academic publications. A methodological issue that arises here pertains to the publication date,
which in more than 100 cases was not given or was unclear (category “N.C.” in Figure 1).
4. In 1987, the EU Parliament declared urs recognition of the Armenian genocide and in 1989, the
European Commission issued an unfavourable statement towards Turkey’s candidacy. 
5. The  outcomes  of  this  strategic  engagement  with  the  Muslim world  lead,  inter  alia, to  the
“Pivotal States Project” of the United States Institute of Peace,  for Turkey were published in
Graham Fuller’s 2007 book The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. 
The term “Pivotal State”,  however, did not form a discursive dynamic of its own accord and
remained a technical term.
6. The Turgut Özal Memorial lectures were instituted in 1997 by the Turkish Research Program of
the Washington Institute, founded in 1995. The Turkish Research Program aims to analyze the
Turkish  political  scene  and its  impacts  on  both  US interests  and American-Turkish  bilateral
relations. 
7. The  Abant  Platform  is  a  non-state  institution  organizing  meetings  and  forums  on  socio-
political issues. The Abant Platform is supported by the Journalist and Writers Foundation, an
organization known to be supportive of the Gülen Movement and hence losing its government
connections after a fall out between the movement and the ruling party in December 2013. 
8. A search through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website’s internal search engine revealed 32
entries for the period between 2007 and 2013. Most of these entries are speeches, interviews, and
newspaper  articles  by  Ahmet  Davutoğlu,  Naci  Koru  (Deputy  Foreign  Minister  since  2012),
ambassadors  located  in  five  world  capitals,  and  former  Foreign  Ministers  Ali  Babacan  and
President Abdullah Gül. There are also some background papers on the MFA and two speeches by
counsellor generals.  While the documents on the website are clearly selected, and hence not
necessarily exhaustive, we can assume that they were chosen by the MFA and, therefore, can be
considered  as  representative  of  the  messages  the  MFA  intends  to  project.  In  contrast,  the
Turkish-language website of the Prime Minister’s website only delivers three entries, which are
also discussed.
9. We need to note here, that coinciding with the development of the Syrian crisis and the AKP
government’s  decision  to  take  a  more  belligerent  stance  towards  Syria  and its  own Kurdish
movements, the promise of a consensus-seeking language has been abandoned in favor of the
language of threats.
10. The data analysis  was executed with voyant-tools.org as  part  of  a  quantitative discourse
analysis. The initial analysis was carried out based on a word document containing a total of 75
speeches  available  from  the  website  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  word  list  was
simplified by combining synonymous entries, plural and singular forms of the same word, as well
as nouns and adjectives (i.e. peaceful and peace; Bosniak and Bosnia; Islam, Muslim and Muslims).
Additional search terms, which were expected in the initial analysis of voyant-tools but did not
produce any results, were subsequently searched manually in the text. The initial outcome of the
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11. A comparable diagram with the countries mentioned does not give a meaningful insight as it
is biased towards political crises and conflicts (hence the three top countries are Syria, Palestine,
and Iraq), and less so towards underlying interests or ideological choices.
ABSTRACTS
Since the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP]
in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has witnessed significant changes. After the euphoric years of
foreign policy pro-activism geared towards the global expansion of Turkey’s influence, domestic
and regional developments have raised questions concerning Ankara’s capacity to achieve its
ambitious foreign policy goals. Parallel to the “rise and fall” of Turkish foreign policy, a similar
cycle can be observed regarding the discourse on Turkey’s “soft power”. This paper seeks to
appraise Turkey’s “soft power” and “model” discourses by establishing the chronology of their
emergence and highlighting the multidimensional  structure of  their  production.  The authors
argue  that  the  discourses  on  Turkey’s  “soft  power”  are  created  within  a  triadic  system  of
discourse production.  This system works through the domains of  think tanks,  academia,  and
foreign policy actors in Turkey and beyond. These domains are bound to each other through
reciprocal relations of interest and are negotiated by gatekeepers, i.e. well-connected persons of
influence. Turkey’s “soft power” discourse is as much a product of Turkish foreign policy itself as
it  is  a  product  of  Turkey’s  relations  with  the  United  States  (US).  Circulating  through  these
different  domains,  and  being  appropriated  by  a  large  number  of  actors  with  differing  and
sometimes contradictory interests, these discourses, reconstructed by the authors in this study,
are highly permeable, diverse, and unstable. For a brief period, they did, however, collectively
contribute to the emergence of an almost hegemonic discourse on Turkey’s soft power, thereby
reinforcing the AKP regime at the beginning of the 2010s.
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